Basel II: developing countries and portfolio diversification by Griffith-Jones, Stephany et al.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 3  •   A U G U S T  2 0 0 4
BASEL II: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION • STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES,
MIGUEL ANGEL SEGOVIANO AND STEPHEN SPRATT
145




Stephany Griffith-Jones, Miguel Ángel Segoviano and
Stephen Spratt
The proposed new Basel Capital Accord aims to better align regulatory
capital with the risk that banks actually take on. This paper argues that
current proposals will inappropriately and significantly increase the cost
or reduce the quantity of bank lending to developing countries, as they
will make the requirements for lending to them far more stringent. The
failure of the Basel proposals to take account of the benefits of
international diversification implies that risk is overestimated at the
portfolio level. We show that, for a number of variables (such as bank
profitability) and for a number of periods, the degree of correlation
between developed economies is greater than that between developed
and developing countries. We also show via simulations that a portfolio
diversified across developed and developing economies has a lower
level of risk than one focused only on developed ones. We therefore urge
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Our concerns about the potential impact of the
proposed new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) were
first expressed following the release of the second
Consultative Paper (CP2) in January 2001.1 However,
since that time a number of modifications have been
made to the proposals that go some way to addressing
these original concerns.
The last paper we prepared on the subject was
published in the Financial Regulator in September
2002.2 There we reiterated our doubts about the
consequences the proposals might have for developing
economies, assessed the likely impact of the
modifications announced by that time, and highlighted
remaining areas of concern. These were twofold.
The first of these concerns is that widespread
adoption of the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach by
internationally active banks would lead to a significant
increase (decrease) in capital requirements for loans to
lower (higher) rated borrowers. To the extent that the
pricing and availability of international bank loans is
influenced by the capital requirements that relate to
them, this would imply a sharp increase in the cost or
a reduction in the quantity of international lending to
developing and emerging economies. Given the current
very low levels of such lending, this raises the
possibility of the current situation becoming
“institutionalized”, so that, even if global conditions
improved, the potential of international bank lending
to contribute towards the development of poorer
countries would be significantly reduced.
It has long been argued that one of the major
benefits of investing in developing and emerging
economies is their relatively low correlation with
“mature” markets. As we show below this is clearly
the case and, consequently, clear benefits —at the
portfolio level— would accrue to banks with well
diversified international portfolios. That is, a bank with
a loan portfolio that is distributed widely across a range
of relatively uncorrelated markets is less likely to face
simultaneous problems in all of those markets than a
bank with loans concentrated in a smaller number of
relatively correlated markets. Therefore, in order to
accurately align regulatory capital with the actual risks
a bank might face, the Accord should take account of
this portfolio-level effect: the capital requirements for
a bank with a well diversified international loan
portfolio should reflect the fact that total risk is lower
than it would be for a more concentrated portfolio. At
present the proposals contain no such considerations,
suggesting that, in this area at least, capital requirements
may not accurately reflect actual risk.
The argument that asset correlation is variable is
self-evident. Furthermore, the suggestion that this
variability impacts upon the level of risk in an overall
portfolio, and should therefore be reflected in capital
requirements, would also seem to have force. Indeed,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has
recognized this fact with the modifications it has
already made in respect of lending to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Following the release
of the original consultative document in January 2001,
there was widespread concern that lending to SMEs
would be adversely affected by a large increase in the
capital requirements associated with such lending.
After intensive lobbying the Committee reconsidered
the issue, and agreed that the treatment of SMEs should
be separated from other corporate lending, with
borrowers with less than 50 million euros in annual
turnover receiving an average reduction in capital
requirements of about 10% relative to larger corporates.
The rationale for this modification is that the chance
of a large number of SMEs defaulting simultaneously
is lower than for a smaller group of large borrowers.
That is, the correlation between probability of default
is lower. Consequently, a loan portfolio that is well
diversified across a large number of SMEs will face
lower overall risk at the portfolio level than one
focused on a few larger borrowers.
The results of our empirical work suggest strongly
that a similar modification is justified with respect to
international diversification.
The second aspect of concern is that the use of
market-sensitive measures of risk —as envisaged in the
  We would like to thank Danielle Nouy, Karsten Von Kleist,
Marian Micu, Serge Jeanneau and Philipp Klingelhofer for providing
us with valuable data and encouragement in this research. Thanks
are also due to Professors Charles Goodhart and Avinash Persaud
for wise counsel in the conceptual and practical aspects of the paper.
Any mistakes are, of course, our own.
1 See Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001).
2 See Griffith-Jones, Spratt and Segoviano (2002).
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IRB approaches— is inherently procyclical. The fact
that capital requirements will move in conjunction with
the business cycle implies an amplification of that cycle
as loans “migrate” between bands as circumstances
improve or deteriorate. The natural tendency of market
practitioners —including bankers— to underestimate
risks in booms and overestimate risks in recessions will
thus be formalized, and legitimized, in regulation.
Thus, in an upturn, the perception of generally reduced
risks would result in lower capital requirements, further
strengthening this perception of lower risk, but perhaps
resulting in a longer “boom” period and the build-up
of greater levels of potentially systemic risk.
Conversely, in a downturn or recession, higher capital
requirements, as determined by the IRB approach, would
reduce further incentives to lend, and —coupled with
the difficulty of raising capital in a recession— create
the possibility of a “credit crunch” wherein even
potentially profitable business propositions were unable
to attract funding. The danger is that a downturn is
turned into a recession, or an existing recession
lengthened or deepened.
These concerns about the potentially damaging
impact of Basel II were viewed in the context of a more
general analysis. This argued that the major problems
facing developing countries in their attempts to access
international finance for purposes of growth and
development were: i) the current low level of all types
of flows (particularly, but not exclusively, bank
lending) and ii) the increasingly short-term and
procyclical nature of these flows (Griffith-Jones, 2002).
Given our view of this discouraging general
environment, it remains of serious concern that the
proposals for Basel II may exacerbate, rather than
attempt to counter, these damaging trends.
This paper will present the results of empirical
work that we have undertaken to address the first point
detailed above. We suggested in our most recent paper
on this subject that one reason why capital
requirements under the new proposals could be
inappropriately high for developing and emerging
economies was that the benefits of international
diversification were not taken into account. We
suggested that, if it could be demonstrated that the
correlation between developed/developed-country
lending was higher than that between developed/
developing, then a case could be made that an
internationally diversified loan portfolio, with a range
of developed- and developing-country borrowers,
would have a lower level of risk –in terms of the
overall portfolio– than one which focused primarily on
developed-country lending. If this is, in fact, the case,
then it would be possible —and certainly desirable—
for the Basel Committee to incorporate the benefits of
international diversification into the new Accord.
This argument is similar to that used to support
the recent modifications (November 2001) that resulted
in a flattening of the IRB curve with respect to corporate
lending. In the original proposals of January 2001 it
was implicitly assumed that the average asset
correlation was 0.2. However, following empirical
research initiated by the Committee, a modification to
the IRB formula was proposed so that the correlation
coefficient would decline from 0.2 to 0.1 as probability
of default increased. In essence, the argument is that a
higher probability of default for a corporate reduces
correlation, as bankruptcy/default may be the result of
any number of non-systemic factors that would not
necessarily have any impact on the prospects for other
corporates.
The argument that asset correlation is variable is
self-evident. Furthermore, the suggestion that this
variability impacts upon the level of risk in an overall
portfolio, and should therefore be reflected in capital
requirements, would also seem to have force.
Consequently, we have followed this approach in our
own empirical work, which, as we shall detail below,
provides strong support for a similar modification of
the IRB formula with respect to internationally
diversified lending.
It has long been argued that one of the major
benefits of investing in developing and emerging
economies is their relatively low correlation with
mature markets. Therefore our first hypothesis can be
stated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The degree of correlation between the
real and financial sectors of developed economies is
greater than that which exists between developed and
developing economies.
We have tested this hypothesis of differential
correlations, first with specific regard to international
bank lending and profitability and, second, in a more
general but supportive sense. All of our results offer
significant support for the validity of this position. This
has provided the basis for a second hypothesis, which
relates specifically to the ongoing work of the Basel
Committee.
Hypothesis 2: An international loan portfolio which is
diversified across the developed, emerging and
developing regions enjoys a more efficient risk/return
trade-off —and therefore lower overall portfolio-level
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risk as measured by unexpected losses— than one
focused exclusively on developed markets.
In order to test this hypothesis we have simulated
levels of unexpected loss for two portfolios, one of
loans that are evenly distributed across developed and
developing regions, the second of loans that are
distributed across only the developed regions. The
results of these simulations provide convincing support
for the second of our hypotheses, suggesting that the
level of unexpected loss that a portfolio focused on
purely developed-country borrowers would face in an
extreme event would be about 25% higher than a
portfolio diversified across developed and developing
countries.
The fact that the tests we have performed, using
a variety of variables, over a range of time periods, all
provide strong evidence in support of our
diversification hypothesis, seems to us compelling.
This evidence is further strengthened by the results of
our simulations of loan portfolios, which, by employing
a similar methodology to that used by the most
sophisticated banks, demonstrate the beneficial impacts
of international diversification, as they would be
viewed by the major banks. Taken together, this
evidence suggests that, so as not to unfairly penalize
emerging and developing economies, the Basel
Committee should closely examine the practicalities of
incorporating the benefits of international
diversification into the forthcoming final consultative
paper. It is hoped that the evidence presented below
will demonstrate the validity of this view.
This paper consists of five sections. After the
present introduction (section I), section II details the
sources of data and methodology used, section III
presents the results of the econometric work, section
IV presents a simulation of two loan portfolios, and
section V explores the implications of our results and
concludes. Technical details on the statistical and
simulation work are contained in appendices A and B.
II
Data and sources
The countries analysed are as follows:
— Developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela;
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, the Republic of
Korea and Thailand; Bulgaria, Poland and Russia;
Nigeria and South Africa.
— Developed countries: Canada and the United
States; Japan; France, Germany, Italy, Spain and
the United Kingdom.
— Others: Singapore; Finland, Greece, Ireland and
Portugal.
The variables analysed are shown in table 1.
III
Results
All the statistical significance tests we have undertaken
provide strong support for our first hypothesis.
Crucially for the validity of our results, cumulative
distribution function (CDF) tests were undertaken in
each instance. The purpose of the tests was to establish,
for any given level of correlation, the probabilities that
the developed/developing series would have a lower
level of correlation than the developed/developed
series. The results of two of these tests are shown in
figures 1 and 2 as an illustration of the fact that, in
every instance, the developed/developed correlation
dominates that of the developed/developing correlation
(the remaining results are contained in appendix A).
That is, for any level of correlation x, the
probability that the actual correlation between
developed/developing indicators is lower than x is
higher than the probability that the correlation between
developed/developed indicators is lower than x.
The results in table 2 offer further support for the
first of our hypotheses, in both a general and a specific
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TABLE 1
Grouping, description and other characteristics of the variables analysed, selected
periods
Grouping Code Description Period Frequency Source
Financial sector ROA Return on assets (banks) 1988-2001 Annual The Banker
Financial sector ROC Return on tier one capital (banks) 1988-2001 Annual The Banker
Financial sector Syndicated Syndicated loan spreads 1993-2002 Monthly Bank for International
Settlements (BIS)
Bonds GBIa Global Bond Index 1987-2002 Daily JP Morgan/Reuters
Bonds EMBIb Emerging Market Bond Index 1987-2002 Daily JP Morgan/Reuters
Bonds EMBI+c Emerging Market Bond Index Plus. 1987-2002 Daily JP Morgan/Reuters
Stocks IFC Gd Standard & Poor and International Finance 1990-2002 Daily IFC/S&P
Corporation (IFC) (global)
Stocks IFC Ie S&P and IFC (investable) 1990-2002 Daily IFC/S&P
Stocks COMP Developed countries listed above: 1990-2002 Daily Reuters
composite stock indexes
Macro GDP GDP growth rate 1985-2000 Six-monthly IMF, World Bank (authors’
calculations)
Macro GDP HP Hodrick-Prescott decomposition of GDP 1950-1998 Annual National data (authors’
calculations)
Macro STIR Short-term nominal interest rate 1985-2000 Six-monthly National data (BIS) or IMF, IFC
Macro STIRR Short-term real interest rate 1985-2000 Six-monthly National data (BIS) or IMF, IFC
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a The GBI consists of regularly traded, fixed-rate domestic government bonds. The countries covered have liquid government debt markets
which are freely accessible to foreign investors. GBI excludes: floating-rate notes, perps, bonds with less than one year maturity, bonds
targeted at the domestic market for tax reasons and bonds with callable, puttable or convertible features.
b Included in the EMBI, which is prepared by J.P. Morgan, are dollar-denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and local debt
market instruments issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities.
c EMBI+ is an extension of the EMBI. The index tracks all of the external currency-denominated debt markets of the emerging markets.
d IFC G (Global) is an emerging equity market index produced jointly by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Standard & Poor (S&P).
The index does not take into account restrictions on foreign ownership that limit the accessibility of certain markets and individual stocks.
e IFC I (Investable) is adjusted to reflect restrictions on foreign investments in emerging markets. Consequently, it presents a more accurate
picture of the actual universe available to investors.
sense. The specific results, for the financial sector, are
presented first, followed by those for other, more
general economic and financial variables.
As can be seen from table 2, all the results were
tested to ensure statistical significance. In all cases, the
results were significant at the 99.5% confidence level
and the null hypothesis that the average mean
correlations of the two series were equal (H0: Mx = My)
was clearly rejected.
1. Discussion
As is clear from table 1, a wide variety of financial,
market and macro variables have been employed in our
tests. Whilst it might be suggested that each of the
variables we have used could be criticized as imperfect
in some way, we would argue strongly that distortions
in the data are likely to be cancelled out, as they are
unlikely to be the result of common causes.
Consequently, the fact that every statistical test that we
have performed, regardless of variable, time period or
frequency, has pointed in the same direction, and all are
clearly statistically significant on a variety of tests, offers
robust and unequivocal support for our first hypothesis.
In the case of spreads on syndicated bank loans,
and adopting the reasonable assumption that they are
indicative of the risk associated with the loans —and
therefore a proxy for probability of default— it is clear
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FIGURE 1
First-order stochastic dominance tests for
correlations on banks’ return on assets
(1988-2001)
FIGURE 2
First-order stochastic dominance tests for
correlations on banks’ return on capital
(1988-2001)






























































































































Variable Period Frequency Developed/ Developed/ Test statistic
developed developing  (H0: Mx = My)
a
mean correlation mean correlation
coefficient coefficient
Syndicated 1993-2002 Monthly 0.37 0.14 3.33 (3.29)
ROA 1988-2001 Annual 0.10 -0.08 4.40 (3.29)
ROC 1988-2001 Annual 0.14 -0.11 6.92 (3.29)
GDP 1985-2000 Six-monthly 0.44 0.02 9.08 (3.29)
GDP HP 1950-1998 Annual 0.35 0.02 9.41 (3.29)
STIR 1985-2000 Six-monthly 0.72 0.23 11.09 (3.29)
STIRR 1985-2000 Six-monthly 0.66 0.22 10.93 (3.29)
GBI-EMBI 1991-2002 Daily 0.78 0.53 5.45 (3.29)
GBI-EMBI 1991-1997 Daily 0.90 0.74 4.64 (3.29)
GBI-EMBI 1998-2002 Daily 0.42 0.09 5.87 (3.29)
IFC I-COMP 1990-2000 Daily 0.58 -0.15 7.83 (3.29)
IFC G-COMP 1990-2000 Daily 0.58 -0.17 8.06 (3.29)
Source: Analysis conducted for this study.
a Critical value of 0.05% one-tailed test.
that risks, as measured in this way, have had a greater
tendency to rise and fall together within the developed
regions than has been the case for the developed and
developing regions. Consequently, this first result
would appear to offer support to our hypothesis. That
is, over the sample period of 1993 to 2002 a bank with
a loan portfolio that was well diversified across the
major developed and developing regions would have
enjoyed diversification benefits at the portfolio level:
the correlation between the risks associated with loans
to each of these regions would have been lower than
was the case for a bank with a loan portfolio which
focused only on developed markets.
Similarly, the fact that the profitability of banks
in developed markets has a slight negative correlation
with that of banks in developing markets, whilst the
profitability of banks within developed markets has a
slight positive correlation, provides further support for
our hypothesis of the benefits of diversification.
Although there may be many factors affecting the level
of profitability of a country’s domestic banking system,
it seems reasonable to assume that one of the more
significant factors would be the incidence of non-
performing loans in the domestic economy. More
generally, the health and consequent profitability of the
country’s domestic economy must plausibly impact
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strongly upon the profitability of its banking sector.
Thus, over the sample period, a bank lending to both
banks and corporates across a wide range of developed
and developing countries would have obtained
diversification benefits, at the portfolio level, relative
to a bank with a loan portfolio concentrated solely on
developed markets.
The results from the macro variables, whilst more
general, give some indication of the extent to which
developed economies have tended to move in step with
each other to a far greater extent than have developed
and developing economies. If we plausibly assume that
the incidence of non-performing loans (NPLs) in an
economy is, at least partially, inversely related to the
rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, then banks
with an internationally diversified portfolio would be
less likely to experience sharp increases in the
incidence of NPLs in these markets simultaneously.
Conversely, a bank that focused entirely on the (more
highly correlated) mature markets would have a greater
chance of experiencing such an outcome. Similar
implications arise if we take movements in short-term
interest rates as a proxy for the business cycle (rising
rates indicating the close of an upturn and vice versa),
and these results provide further evidence in support
of our argument. As with GDP growth, the fact that
business cycles —and therefore movements in short-
term interest rates— are more correlated between
developed countries than between developed and
developing countries suggests that the incidence of
NPLs and defaults is likely to be more correlated in the
former than the latter.
For many market practitioners, movements in
government bond prices and yields are seen as a strong
indicator of both economic fundamentals and market
views on the economic prospects of each country. The
fact that developed-country bond prices move in step
to a far greater extent than do developed- and
developing-country prices suggests a closer correlation
between both economic fundamentals in developed
countries and market sentiment towards them. The
evidence of lower correlation between developed and
developing stock markets also supports this view. To
the extent that a country’s stock market reflects
economic fundamentals and investor sentiment towards
the country, a lower correlation between developed and
developing countries provides further evidence in
support of our first hypothesis.
The evidence presented above clearly supports
our hypothesis that a bank whose loan portfolio is
diversified internationally between developed and
developing countries will have lower overall
portfolio risk than one which focuses exclusively on
lending to developed countries. In order to test this
hypothesis in the specific context of a bank’s loan
portfolio, a simulation exercise has been undertaken
to assess the potential unexpected loss resulting from
a portfolio diversified within developed countries,




The testing of our second hypothesis involves the
construction of two simulated loan portfolios, which
enables us to assess the probable level of unexpected
loss in each portfolio. Thus we can directly compare
the simulated behaviour of a portfolio diversified
across developed and developing regions with one
focused solely on developed markets.
The basic context for our approach and the results
obtained are detailed below. Appendix B contains more
information, as well as technical details of the
construction of the simulated portfolios.
1. Context
The fact that the quality of the credit portfolio of any
bank can change at any time in the future means that
there is a need to make frequent calculations of the
losses that a bank could suffer, under a variety of
situations. Given the constant changes in portfolio
quality, it is unlikely that the computed preventive
reserves will be the same for different periods. The
difference between preventive reserves computed at
different periods (due to changing credit quality) is the
cause of the potential losses to the bank—those that
could erode its capital in extreme situations. These
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losses are called “unexpected losses”. Our second
hypothesis, in effect, states that the levels of
unexpected loss for a portfolio that is diversified across
developed and developing markets will be lower than
that for a portfolio that focuses exclusively on
developed markets. This hypothesis is supported, in
principle, by the results of our statistical work above,
which demonstrated that there was a lower level of
correlation between developed and developing markets
than among developed markets only.
2. Simulation
The approach we employ represents a modification of
the well known CreditMetrics approach, which has
been widely used to simulate unexpected losses in
portfolios. Following a similar approach, two simulated
portfolios were constructed: one with an even
distribution of loans across the major developed and
developing regions, the other with the loan portfolio
evenly distributed across the developed regions. We
then programmed an algorithm that simulated 10,000
different “quality scenarios” that might impact on these
portfolios, and so produce migration of loans between
credit quality bands.3 Each quality scenario shows a
change in the market value of the assets of the creditors
in the portfolio, and therefore the difference between
the initial and final credit quality can be assessed. Once
the credit portfolio quality scenarios have been
simulated, it is possible to compute the losses or gains
that come from the difference between initial and final
credit quality.
The losses or gains obtained from the simulation
process are used to build a histogram, which
summarizes the loss distribution of the credit portfolio.
From this distribution a “value at risk” (VaR) is defined
from which we obtain the amount of unexpected losses
from the portfolio.4 The unexpected losses divided by
the total amount of the portfolio represent the
percentage that, with a given probability (defined by
the chosen percentile), could be lost in an extreme
event.
3. Results
The results obtained from our simulations (table 3)
offer strong support for our second hypothesis. As the
table shows, the unexpected losses simulated for the
portfolio focused on developed-country borrowers are,
on average, almost 23% higher than for the portfolio
diversified across developed and developing countries.
4. Discussion
The simulated loan portfolios constructed offer clear
evidence that international diversification produces a
more efficient risk/return trade-off for banks at the
portfolio level. Given that capital requirements are
intended to deal with unexpected loss, the fact that the
level of unexpected loss in our simulation is lower for
3 Developing regions include Africa and the Middle East, Asia and
the Pacific, developing Europe and Latin America. Developed
regions include European Union countries outside economic and
monetary union, those within it, other industrialized countries and
offshore centres.
4 There are, of course, many problems with and criticisms of the
VaR approach to risk management. See Zigrand and Danielsson
(2001) and Persaud (2001), for example. However, it is beyond
the scope of this paper to assess these issues. For the purposes
of this research, our simulation is designed to demonstrate –in
broad terms– the relative difference in unexpected losses that
would be likely to occur in each portfolio, in a similar fashion
to that currently practised by many major, internationally active
banks.
TABLE 3
Comparison of non-industrially diversified portfolios
(Weights and percentages)
Portfolio diversified between developed Portfolio diversified among
and developing countries developed countries
Total exposure = 117 625 333.00 Total exposure = 117 625 333.00
Percentile Loss value Unexpected Percentile Loss value Unexpected Percentage
loss loss difference
99.8 22 595 312 19.21 99.8 27 869 349 23.69 +23.34
99.9 26 390 246 22.44 99.9 32 187 075 27.36 +21.96
Source: Analysis conducted for this study.
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a diversified than for an undiversified portfolio
suggests that, in order to accurately reflect the actual
risks that banks may face, Basel II should take account
of this effect.
It is, of course, always possible to question the
assumptions which underpin any simulation. We have
attempted to ensure that our assumptions are as
reasonable as possible. One aspect that we considered
in detail was that the decision to assume no industrial
diversification within countries might prevent the
benefits of such diversification in developed countries
–which generally have a greater range of industries
than do developing countries– from being taken into
account. We concluded, however, that the potential
benefits of such diversification may have traditionally
been overstated. This position is supported by recent
empirical work produced by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders,
2002). Using data from 105 Italian banks over the
period 1993-1999, these authors test empirically for
evidence in support of the theoretical benefits of
industrial, sectoral and geographical diversification.
The results, although somewhat surprising, would seem
to offer support for both the assumptions that underpin
the loan portfolio simulation (i.e., no industrial
diversification) and, crucially, the general findings of
our empirical work.
From the combined results on bank loan return
and risk, we conclude that increased industrial loan
diversification results in an inefficient risk-return trade-
off for the (Italian) banks in our sample, and sectoral
diversification results in an inefficient risk-return trade-
off for banks with relatively high levels of risk.
Geographical diversification on the other hand does
result in an improvement in the risk-return trade-off for
banks with low or moderate levels of risk (Acharya,
Hasan and Saunders, 2002, p. 5).
However, in order to be certain that the simulation
results had not been biased by this assumption, a
second series of simulations was undertaken. In this
instance, both geographical and industrial
diversification was assumed. As can be seen in table 4,
this modification —which brings the simulation closer
to real practice— has the effect of halving the level of
unexpected loss in the portfolios; thus they are now
closer to the 8% figure which is often encountered in
the real world, and which forms the basis of the Basel
Committee’s stated capital requirements for the system
as a whole.
The difference between the simulated unexpected
losses in the two portfolios has also been reduced by
this modification, although less so. At almost 17%, on
average, the difference remains highly significant, and
so offers further evidence of the robustness of our
results.
Another issue that we have given consideration to
is the fact that correlations are not constant over time.
The danger, of course, is that correlations among
emerging markets increase dramatically in crises, as
contagion spreads the crisis from one country or region
to another. In this instance, it is possible that a portfolio
diversified across a range of emerging and developing
regions might be hit simultaneously in each of them.
However, while this may well be the common
perception of emerging market behaviour in crises, it
may only apply to a limited number of cases, which
require specific preconditions to be in place;
preconditions which at the current time —and indeed
at most times— do not apply. Kaminsky, Reinhart and
Vegh (2002) examine 200 years of financial crises, in
both developed and developing countries, for evidence
of contagion. They conclude that “fast and furious”
contagion of the type described above may occur, but
only under certain circumstances. Of the major
TABLE 4
Comparison of two simulated industrially diversified portfolios
(Weights and percentages)
Portfolio diversified between developed Portfolio diversified among
and developing countries developed countries
Total exposure = 117 625 333.00 Total exposure = 117 625 333.00
Percentile Loss value Unexpected Percentile Loss value Unexpected Percentage
loss loss difference
99.8 15 111 321 12.85 99.8 17 665 318 15.02 16.90
99.9 15 358 788 13.06 99.9 17 960 850 15.27 16.94
Source: Analysis conducted for this study.
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emerging market crises since 1980, the Mexican
default of 1982, the Mexican devaluation of 1994, the
devaluation of the Thai baht in 1997 and the Russian
default of 1998 were all seen as instances where
significant contagion did occur. However, with the
exception of the Russian default, which affected all
emerging and developing regions, as well as the
developed world to a surprising extent (Davis, 1999),
the resultant contagion was restricted to the same
region. Consequently, a portfolio diversified across all
emerging and developing regions would not have
suffered simultaneous problems to the extent described
above. On the other hand, more recent events, such as
the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, Turkey’s
devaluation in early 2001 and the problems starting in
Argentina towards the end of 2001, have been
associated with far less contagion, and have not
become an emerging market-wide phenomenon.
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2002) suggest that
for a crisis to spread beyond regional boundaries, an
investment boom, or bubble, has to precede it. In this
way, actors beyond the region become involved in
events there, and so the crisis may spread —via
common creditors to some extent— to other emerging,
and even developing regions. The current environment
is certainly not one of boom with regard to capital
flows to emerging and developing economies.
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that such circumstances
will reoccur in the foreseeable future, which means that
the preconditions required for system-wide contagion
are not in place and the benefits of widespread
diversification will remain a reality.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) also emphasize
this point. Their research suggests that financial turmoil
in the “periphery” (developing countries) only has
systemic implications, such as contagion beyond the
immediate region, when asset markets in one of the
major financial centres (developed world) are affected.
“Thus,” as these authors put it, “financial centers serve
a key role in propagating financial turmoil. When
financial centers remain safe, problems in an emerging
market stop at the region’s border” (ibid., p. 3).
V
Conclusions
The expressed purpose of the proposed new Basel
Capital Accord is to better align regulatory capital with
actual risk. This process, it is argued, will put bank
lending on a sounder regulatory footing and remove the
many distortions that have come to be recognized in
the existing Accord. We have argued that the current
proposals run the risk of causing an increase in cost
and/or reduction in quantity of bank lending to
developing countries, as a consequence of the sharp
increase in capital requirements for lending to lower-
rated borrowers. The response to this argument is that
any changes in capital requirements are justified on the
basis that, whilst the capital associated with lower-
(higher-) rated borrowers is to rise (fall) significantly,
relative to the existing situation, this merely reflects the
more accurate measurement of risk.
However, as we have demonstrated in this paper,
the failure of the proposals to date to take account of
the benefits of international diversification suggests
that, in this instance at least, risk is not being accurately
measured. That is, by excluding the possibility that
banks’ capital requirements should take account of
portfolio and diversification effects, the proposals
effectively impose an inaccurate measure of actual risk,
at the portfolio level. At present, the most sophisticated
banks often do take account of the benefits of
diversification in their international lending decisions.
The fact that the proposals under Basel II will not allow
these diversification benefits to be taken into account
suggests that the regulatory capital associated with
lending to developing countries will be higher than that
which banks would —and currently do— choose to put
aside on the basis of their own models.
The Basel Committee has already made a number
of modifications to the original proposals of January
2001 (CP2), the most significant being the modifications
to the IRB formula to take account of variable asset
correlation as related to default, and those relating to
SMEs. Following the release of CP2 there was
widespread concern that lending to SMEs would be
adversely affected by a large increase in the capital
requirements associated with such lending. After
intensive lobbying, the Basel Committee has
reconsidered the issue. The general changes to the IRB
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formula with respect to corporate lending, whereby the
curve has been significantly flattened, will obviously
be of benefit to SMEs. However, the Basel Committee
has gone further. In July 2002 it released a document
that highlighted major areas where agreement had been
reached. This included the following in relation to the
treatment of SMEs:
In recognition of the different risks associated with SME
borrowers, under the IRB approach for corporate credits,
banks will be permitted to separately distinguish loans
to SME borrowers (defined as those with less than Euro
50 mn in annual sales) from those to larger firms. Under
the proposed treatment, exposures to SMEs will be able
to receive a lower capital requirement than exposures
to larger firms. The reduction in the required amount of
capital will be as high as twenty percent, depending on
the size of the borrower, and should result in an average
reduction of approximately ten percent across the entire
set of SME borrowers in the IRB framework for corporate
loans (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2002).
Thus, in the case of SME lending, the Basel
Committee has recognized the impact that differential
asset correlation can have on portfolio-level risk. Our
results strongly suggest that a similar modification is
justified with respect to internationally diversified
lending.
The specific manner in which the Basel
Committee might want to incorporate these findings
is, of course, best left to them. Given the experience
and expertise at their disposal we would not at this
stage want to offer suggestions as to the means by
which these modifications might be made. However,
given the changes already made to the IRB formula
with respect to SMEs, as well as the fact that the
changes we propose would seem to have at least as
solid an empirical basis, there are no theoretical,
empirical or practical reasons why changes should not
be made to incorporate the benefits of international
diversification.
APPENDIX A
Cumulative distribution function testsa
A.1. First-order stochastic dominance tests
for correlations on syndicated loan spreads
 (1993-2002)
A.2. First-order stochastic dominance tests
for correlations on banks’ return on capital
(1988-2001)
A.3. First-order stochastic dominance tests
for correlations on banks’ return on assets
(1988-2001)
A.4. First-order stochastic dominance tests
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Source: Analysis conducted for this study.
A.5. First-order stochastic dominance tests
for correlations on real short-term interest rates
(1985-2000)
A.6. First-order stochastic dominance tests
for correlations on stock exchange movements
(IFC I-COMP: 1990-2002)
A.7. First-order stochastic dominance tests
for correlations on stock exchange movements
(IFC G-COMP: 1990-2002)
A.8. First-order stochastic dominance tests
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APPENDIX B
Computation of unexpected losses
Considering that the quality of the credit portfolio of any
bank can change at any time in the future, there is a need to
make frequent calculations of the expected losses that this
portfolio could suffer under different risk situations. Given
these constant changes in portfolio quality, it is unlikely that
the computed expected losses will be the same for different
periods. The difference between expected losses computed
at different periods (due to changing credit quality) is the
cause of potential losses to banks that could erode their
capital in extreme situations. These losses are called
“unexpected losses” and their estimation is the issue to be
addressed in this appendix.
Unexpected losses arise because of joint credit quality
changes among the credits that conform a portfolio. In order
to model such quality changes, we adopted a portfolio
approach.
This method5 has been amply documented and adopted
in diverse finance applications. Under this theory, investors
formulate their investment portfolio, carefully considering the
optimal risk-return relationship that a given portfolio has.
With this in mind, credit risk modellers have already
developed risk evaluation techniques that aim to take account
of the portfolio diversification effect. Although such
approaches might be subject to improvements, we do believe
that portfolio diversification could and should be an integral
part of credit risk valuation for regulation purposes.6 As we
have argued in the main body of the paper and in previous
work, we believe that negative economic outcomes will be
provoked by the fact that the proposed regulation framework
only punishes high risk-taking and does not provide
incentives for portfolio diversification.
In this appendix we present a modification to the
CreditMetrics methodology that has been used to simulate
unexpected credit losses in the portfolios analysed.7 J.P.
Morgan (1997) describes the CreditMetrics model as “a full
portfolio view addressing credit event correlations which
identify the costs of over concentration and benefits of
diversification”. The objective of this appendix is to present
the modifications that were made to the CreditMetrics
approach in order to make possible its implementation.8
Hereinafter we shall refer to the modified version of the
CreditMetrics methodology, which we have termed the Full
Credit Risk Model (FCRM).
The Full Credit Risk Model
Empirical studies showing credit defaults to be correlated
have been widely presented. Here we present evidence that
credit risk can also be diversified. In order to calculate
portfolio diversification, it would be necessary to know the
probability that each of the credits making up a portfolio
migrate jointly from their current rating (credit quality) to
each of the possible ratings. For this, we would need to have
a number of tables of joint probabilities equivalent to the
number of pairs of credits making up a portfolio. This
objective is unattainable given the lack of reliable data, the
amount required, and the complexity of it.
The CreditMetrics approach makes use of two main
elements: the Merton approach for modelling credit quality
changes, and an indirect approach for modelling correlations
among the credits that make up a credit portfolio.
Finally, once a correlations matrix among the creditors
making up the credit portfolio is built, this methodology
simulates the unexpected losses for the portfolio.
a) The Merton approach for modelling credit quality
changes
The Merton approach assumes that equity can be
viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike
price equal to the book value of the firm’s debts (Merton,
1974). The intuition behind this assumption is that given the
limited liability feature of equity, equity holders have the
right but not the obligation to pay off debt holders and take
over the remaining assets of the firm. This approach implies
that the credit quality (rating) of a given creditor is related
to the difference between the market value of its assets and
its debt.
With this approach, the change in the value of the assets
of a given company is related to the change in its rating.
Therefore, the distribution of the company’s asset returns can
be used to calculate the distribution of probabilities of change
in its rating. For the generalization of this model, it is
necessary to include, in addition to the default state, different
credit quality states.
The transition matrix is the variable that summarizes
the probabilities of migration from one credit quality to any
other. Knowing the probabilities of transition between
different credit qualities and considering the Merton
approach, it is possible to derive the market value of assets
that represent the cut-off values between different credit
qualities, as shown in figure B.1. These cut-off values fulfil
the condition that if the change in the market value of the
asset (r) is sufficiently negative (i.e., smaller than ZE), then
the credit falls into default; if ZE < r < ZD, the credit is rated
D, and so on.
Taking into consideration the empirical transition
matrix, it is possible to estimate the probability of these
5 See Markowitz (1959).
6 It is not our intention at this point to analyse the possible
improvements to each methodology.
7 The choice of this model was dictated by considerations of
modelling simplicity and the availability of data. It is not our
intention to favour any specific credit risk modelling technique.
8 See J.P. Morgan (1997) for a detailed exposition.
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changes happening as follows (for a credit initially rated
as X):
Prob(E|X) = Prob(r < ZE) = ϕ(ZE)
Prob(D|X) = Prob(ZE < r < ZD) = ϕ(ZD) – ϕ(ZE)
Prob(C|X) = Prob(ZD < r < ZC) = ϕ( ZC) – ϕ(ZD)
Prob(B|X) = Prob(ZC < r < ZB) = ϕ(ZB) – ϕ(ZC)
Prob(A|X) = Prob(ZB < r < ZA) = 1 – ϕ(ZB)
where:
r = implied market value of assets.
ϕ = cumulative distribution function for the normal
distribution.
From this point of view, the correlation matrix of
changes of credit quality between creditors can be computed
by developing an explanatory model of the changes in the
value of the borrowers’ assets.
This approach presents several practical problems for
implementation, the most important being the handling of
very large correlation matrices. Additionally, it is not possible
to obtain the changes in the market value of assets for each
particular borrower, since it would be necessary to have
specific information about the internal financial structure of
each of them. These two disadvantages make it impossible
to implement an ideal correlation matrix, and we shall
consequently adopt an indirect (but more manageable)
method of introducing the portfolio diversification effect.
b) An indirect approach to modelling correlations among
the credits that make up a credit portfolio
Following the Merton approach, J.P. Morgan (1997)
makes an a priori distinction between the factors that
determine the changes in the value of borrowers’ assets. This
distinction comes from two basic components: the market
component and the idiosyncratic component. By definition,
the idiosyncratic component does not correlate with anything,
since it refers to those factors that are unique to the borrower.
But the market component brings with it all the elements
needed for portfolio diversification.
rtotal = WM rmarket + WI ridiosyncratic
where:
WM = percentage of returns explained by the market
component.9
rmarket = market component of returns.
WI = percentage of returns explained by the
idiosyncratic component.10
ridiosyncratic = the idiosyncratic component of returns.
Conversely, the market component of returns is defined
as:
rmarket = HA rGDP country + (1 – HA) rGDP economic activity
where:
HA = percentage of market component explained by
the GDP of the borrower’s geographical area.
The Herfindahl index computes this parameter.
rGDP country = return on the GDP of the borrower’s country.
(1 – HA) = percentage of market component explained by
the GDP of the borrower’s economic activity.
rGDP economic activity = return on the GDP of the borrower’s
economic activity.
The market component of returns is divided between
economic activity and geographical area. Which is more
relevant for a borrower? Is it his economic activity or the
country where his business is carried on? The percentage of
participation of these market factors in the borrower’s
systemic risk is exogenous to the model, so a methodology
was designed to solve this problem in the most objective way
possible (Segoviano, 1998).
This methodology was based on the fact that the greater
the variety of economic activities in a country, the lesser the
effect (on the value of assets of a borrower in that country)
of a sudden change in the country’s production. Within this
framework it is possible to infer that in those countries where
there are few economic activities (and thus a high economic
activity concentration), the most important factor for the
borrower’s asset values will be his geographical location. The
intuition behind this reasoning is the fact that if the country
FIGURE B.1
Distribution of asset returns
Source: Analysis conducted for this study.
AE CD B
Ze Zd Zc Zb
9 J.P. Morgan (1997) explains how these weights can be calculated.
After empirical implementations, it is proved that an acceptable value
of W is 70%. For our exercise, we assume this value.
10 The idiosyncratic component weight is obtained with the following
equation:
w wI M= −1
2
The objective of this equation is to be consistent with the change in
the market value of the assets’ standardized returns.
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is affected by an economic shock, it is very likely that the
borrower will experience a decrease in the value of his assets,
since he is highly likely to belong to the economic activities
that have been affected.
Following this reasoning, we computed a Herfindahl




























XAi = the participation of economic activity i in country
group A.11
Once all the elements that compose the market
component of asset returns have been considered, the next
step is to calculate the correlations between the borrowers
making up a credit portfolio.
Given a pair of borrowers X and Y, working in industrial
activities B and V located in country groups A and E and with
returns expressed in the following way:
r w r w H r w H rX IX IX MX A A MX A B= + + −( )1
r w r w H r w H rY IY IY MY E E MY E v= + + −( )1
the problem of estimating the correlations between each pair
of creditors in the portfolio is summarized in the following
way:
ρ ρ ρXY MX A MY E AE MX A MY E BVw H w H w H w H= + −( ) −( )1 1 12
where:
ρAE  = correlation between different country groups.
13
ρBV  = correlation between different economic activities.
14
This equation is computed for each pair of borrowers
making up the portfolio. The results of computing this
equation are compiled in an (n x n) square matrix, where n
is the number of creditors in the portfolio. This matrix is
named the matrix of correlation between creditors and is
unique for each portfolio. It is an extremely important
variable for the simulation of unexpected losses, since it
incorporates the elements necessary for quantifying the
concentration/diversification of the portfolio.
With these elements, we show in the following section
how quality scenarios for the portfolio are simulated. From
these, we build the loss distribution from which it is possible
to obtain the unexpected losses.
c) Simulation of quality scenarios for the credit portfolio
Combining the transition matrix with the matrix of
correlation between creditors, we simulate quality scenarios
from which the loss distribution for the credit portfolio is
obtained.
As explained above, the transition matrix indicates the
probabilities of quality changes that a creditor with a given
rating might experience. Additionally, the correlations of
quality changes between creditors is involved. Creditors with
similar characteristics will tend to migrate jointly to different
credit qualities when hit by economic shocks. Creditors with
different characteristics will tend to migrate disjointly to
different credit qualities when hit by economic shocks. This
implies that credit portfolios concentrated in credits with
similar characteristics will tend to have higher unexpected
losses since they will not be diversifying the possible
economic risks.
We programmed an algorithm to compute 10,000
possible quality scenarios for each of the (n x n) pairs of
creditors that make up the portfolio. Each quality scenario
shows a change in the market value of the assets of the
creditors in the portfolio. This process is repeated 10,000
times. The quality changes of the members of the portfolio
can be used to generate an amount of losses or profits that
conform the loss distribution of the portfolio.
In order to generate these scenarios, the following
process is computed:
i) Generation of random uniform numbers.
ii) Transformation of these random numbers into normal
standard random numbers.
iii) Transformation of the normal standard random numbers
into normal multivariated random numbers with
variance equal to the matrix of correlation between
creditors.
Since it was assumed that the process generating
changes in the assets followed a normal distribution, we use
normal random multivariated distribution to generate joint
quality migrations, where credits with high correlation will
tend to migrate jointly.
11 The higher the Herfindhal index for a given country group, the
less economic activity is diversified. Thus, the percentage of the
market component explained by the GDP of the borrower’s country
takes on more importance.
12 Since the correlations between idiosyncratic components and
geographical components, between idiosyncratic components and
economic activity components and between economic activity
components and geographical components are assumed to be zero.
13 These correlations were computed between the spreads of
syndicated loans for each country group. We considered that such
spreads represented the riskiness of the financial system in each
country group.
14 These correlations were computed between indexes for each of the
economic activities considered in the exercise. Each economic activity
index was built with the economic activity component of the GDP of
a representative country for each country group in the sample.
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Once the credit portfolio quality scenarios have been
simulated, it is possible to compute the losses/gains that come
from the difference between initial and final credit qualities.
The losses/gains obtained from the simulation process are
used to build a histogram which summarizes the loss
distribution of the credit portfolio.
Simulated unexpected losses must be ordered to
generate the loss distribution. From this distribution a Value
at Risk (VaR) is defined from which we obtain the amount
of unexpected losses from the portfolio. The unexpected
losses divided by the total amount of the portfolio represent
the percentage that with a given probability (defined by the
chosen percentile) could be lost in an extreme event. Thus,
capital requirements should be such that they can cover such
losses.
FIGURE B.2
Distribution of credit portfolio losses
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